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ABSTRACT 
In October 2010, having drawn crucial lessons fom the Financial Crisis which was triggered in 
2007,  and  whose  impact  was  still  evident  at  the  time,  the  Financial  Stability  Board 
Recommendations on systemically important financial institutions „called for an assessment, on the 
basis of the BCBS Recommendations and the draft FSB Key Attributes of Effective Resolution 
Regimes (FSB Key Attributes),  of  national  authorities’ capacity to resolve SIFIs under existing 
resolution  regimes  and of  the  legislative  and other  changes  to  national  resolution  regimes  and 
policies needed to accomplish effective resolution.“ 
As well as attempting to highlight why much greater initiatives and efforts are required in relation 
to exit mechanisms for failing banks – that is, greater initiatives and efforts than prudential aspects 
of regulation which embrace capital adequacy procedures, this paper also draws attention to vital 
steps that could be taken at international level to make cross-border resolutions more effective. 
Key Words: lender of last resort, special resolution regime, Financial Crisis, liquidation, bankruptcy, 
systemic risks, living wills, bailing in, resolution procedures, deposit protection, liquidity
The Need for Revised Resolution Regimes and Supervisory Arrangements
Marianne Ojo1
A. Introduction 
Maintaining the close involvement of national  central  banks in prudential  supervision has been 
highlighted by the European Central Bank (ECB) as a vital pre requisite, not only in facilitating the 
Euro system’s adequate contribution to monitoring risks to financial stability in the Euro zone, but 
also in ensuring smooth coordination between central bank functions which are carried out at supra 
national level and supervisory functions carried out at national level.2 It  has been observed that 
since the start of the Crisis, the ECB has complained of a lack of information on banks which have 
the potential to trigger systemic failures.3 Further, the existence of legal impediments to the sharing 
of information between national regulators in the Euro zone and the ECB has been noted.4 
An approach whereby a European system of supervisory agencies consisting of national prudential 
agencies which would be aggregated within a single supervisory system with cross border structures 
–  similar  to  the  European  System of  Central  Banks,  has  been  proposed.5 Further,  a  European 
prudential supervisory agency would not only be responsible for strategic supervisory decisions, but 
also the design of policies.6 It would also assist in the resolution of disputes between home and 
country supervisors.7
The task of harmonisation in the area of bank regulation and supervision in the Euro zone however, 
appears to be a daunting one. Given the diverse structures of regulation across Euro member states, 
it  is  not  so  difficult  to  understand  why  the  ECB  has  no  formal  supervisory  role.8 The 
recommendations of the Report of the High Level Group on Financial Supervision in the EU, which 
are aimed at re building the structure of financial regulation and supervision in the EU, consist of 
three new elements.9 
Financial crises such as those of Northern Rock, IKB and Hypo Real Estates in Europe, have lead to 
1 Contact Email: marianneojo@hotmail.com
2   LB Smaghi, ‘Central Bank Independence in the EU: From Theory to Practice’ European Law Journal, Vol. 14, No. 
4, July 2008, p 454.  
3  W Buiter, Central Banks and Financial Crises (Paper presented at the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City’s 
symposium on “Maintaining Stability in a Changing Financial System”, at Jackson Hole, Wyoming, on August 21-
23, 2008) at page 113. 
4  ibid
5  See J Lawson and S Barnes  and Marte Sollie  ‘Financial  Market  Stability in the European Union:  Enhancing 
Regulation and Supervision’ Economics Department Working Paper No. 670 page 37 and also D Schoenmaker and 
S Oosterloo, “Financial Supervision in Europe: A Proposal for a New Architecture”, in: L. Jonung, C. Walkner and 
M. Watson (eds),  Building the Financial Foundations of the Euro - Experiences and Challenges, 2008 Routledge, 
London. <http://www.olis.oecd.org/olis/2009doc.nsf/LinkTo/NT00000C9A/$FILE/JT03259984.PDF>  
6  ibid
7  ibid
8  See W Buiter, Central Banks and Financial Crises at page 113.
9  See W Nier, ‘Financial Stability Frameworks and the Role of Central Banks: Lessons from the Crisis’ IMF Working 
Paper WP/09/70 April 2009 at pages 21 and 22; Also see De Larosière, 2009, “Report of the High-level Group on 
a review of arrangements involving the central banks in the jurisdictions concerned. The occurrence 
of these crises also highlighted the need for a special resolution regime and a “bridge bank” whose 
aims are to address the needs of failing banks. 
B. Resolution Regimes and the Central Bank's Role in Maintaining Financial Stability
Resolution Regimes
„The terms “resolution” and “resolution regime” are understood as referring to any action by a 
national  authority,  with  or  without  private  sector  involvement,  intended  to  maintain  financial 
stability and/or address serious problems in a financial institution that imperil its viability (eg a 
substantive condition of authorisation) where, absent resolution, the institution is no longer viable 
and there is no reasonable prospect of it becoming so.“10
Three types of resolution regimes as identified,11   are as follows:
Special resolution regimes : 
− These enable authorities to take control of banks and other financial group companies before 
or upon insolvency and that  provide a  wider range of resolution or stabilisation powers 
thereafter.  Full-blown special  resolution  regimes  are  mainly administrative  regimes,  and 
they provide directed transfer powers. This includes an ability to effect partial transfers of 
the  assets  and  liabilities  of  the  financial  institution  to  third  party  purchasers  or  bridge 
institutions,  without  needing  to  obtain  the  consent  of  shareholders,  creditors  and 
counterparties of the failed institution.
Special administration or management regimes12
Mixed regimes13
According  to  Raghallaigh  and  Kennedy,14 principal  features  of  „special  resolution  or 
conservatorship“ should provide that:
– the regime is statutory and ex ante
Financial Supervision in the EU,” Brussels, Feb 25, 2009. These elements comprise of a macro prudential authority 
(ESRC),  a  micro  prudential  authority (ESFS) and a  consolidation of  sectoral  committees  such  as  those of  the 
CEBS,CEIOPS and CESR which elevates their status to that of “authorities” which are conferred specific powers 
aimed at guaranteeing consistent supervision across the EU.  
10  Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Resolution Policies and Frameworks – Progress So Far, July 2011, BIS 
Publications at page 7.
11 See ibid at page 8.
12  „which are hybrid administrative/judicial regimes in which the banking supervisors or resolution authorities appoint 
special  officials (variously referred to as special  administrators,  provisional  administrators,  special  managers or 
statutory managers) to implement resolutions. They are designed to facilitate a (going concern) restructuring and/or 
recapitalisation  of  the  failing  institution.  Should  a  restructuring  not  be  possible  under  these  regimes,  a  forced 
liquidation or bankruptcy-type process generally applies. „ see ibid
13  which are „without the full range of powers exhibited by the first two groups, in some cases because the powers can 
only be exercised with the consent or on a majority vote of shareholders and/or creditors, and in some cases because 
the regime strongly relies on court-administered proceedings, in particular in the insolvency liquidation phase. These 
arrangements nevertheless are generally distinct from corporate insolvency procedures.“ ibid
14  See  F Raghallaigh and M Kennedy, „Banking Crises and Special Resolution Regimes“ February 2011 at page 25.
– It operates within the sphere of public administrative law
– It recognises the systemic nature of banking (the unique nature of banks)
– It  enhances  the  pre-emptive  function  of  conventional  oversight  (including  ultimately 
through seizure)
– It requires banks to have their own resolution plans (living wills)
– The regulator's  toolkit  to deal with failure is  expanded (typically through the vehicle of 
bridge banks)
– The regime provides for the cross border or international aspect of banking; and
– It provides for the absorption of losses by loan capital.
II. The Central Bank’s Role in Maintaining Stability. 
Central bank independence has been the preferred means to facilitating monetary stability since the 
end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s and factors contributing to this include: Fact that in 
the EU, the Maastricht Treaty on European Union made legal central bank independence a conditio  
sine qua non  to participating in European Monetary Union. This is in addition to the other four 
criteria of economic convergence and the additional requirements regarding fiscal responsibility. 
The second factor emanates from the skills, expertise and superior qualifications of central bankers 
when compared to those of politicians.15 The separation or combination of the roles of the central 
bank as lender of last resort and supervisor constitutes a controversial topic. It is argued that whilst 
a supervisory authority like the Fed Reserve has greater likelihood to possess “institution specific 
information”  which  is  vital  for  performing  the  LLR  role  effectively,  it  is  also  susceptible  to 
regulatory capture.16 Furthermore,  supervisory authorities  such as the Bank of England and the 
European Central Bank are considered to be less vulnerable to the possibility of being captured, but 
not so well informed about impending liquidity or solvency problems in systemically prone and 
important financial institutions.17 
In addition to its monetary policy setting functions, there are many reasons in favour of the central 
bank also acting as supervisor18 and these are as follows: That the central bank must have concern 
for the efficient working of the payments system and that as a result, it should also supervise and 
regulate at  least  the main money-market commercial banks at  the heart of the system; that any 
rescue or liquidity crises will usually require quick injection of cash-which can only be done by the 
central bank. For this reason, it is argued that the central bank and supervisory body work closely 
together and that this can best be achieved through internalising the supervisory body within the 
central bank; and that separation would involve wasteful duplication as there is bound to be a lot of 
overlap  between  areas  of  interest  of  and  information  required  by  and  accessible  to  both  the 
supervisor and the central bank. 
Arguments for separation include: Where government financing is required for any large rescue, 
politicians and the Ministry of Finance are likely to be involved. For this reason, it is important for 
the central bank to become more independent in the conduct of monetary policy and less politically 
involved in its supervisory role; that bank failures affect credibility and the central bank requires 
15  See RM Lastra, Legal Foundations of International Financial Stability 2006 45-46.
16  See for example Buiter ‘Central Banks and Financial Crises’ at page 120.  
17  ibid
18  C Goodhart and D Schoenmaker ' Institutional Separation Between Supervisory and Monetary Agencies ' (Financial 
Markets Group Special Papers 1992 )140-141; CAE Goodhart The Emerging Framework of Financial Regulation 
(1998) 249.
credibility in conducting its monetary policies; and where concerns for the micro-level health and 
stability  of  parts  of  the  banking  system might  affect  the  aim of  the  central  bank’s  conduct  of 
monetary macro-policy – that is, where there is conflict of interest between the combination of 
monetary and regulatory function. 
As a result of its business relationships with credit institutions, its local presence and its general 
proximity to the market, the Bundesbank has deep insights into the financial sector and possesses 
knowledgeable,  qualified  staff  who  deal  with  issues  relating  to  the  financial  market  and  its 
stability.19 It  is  therefore not surprising that  the German Parliament approved the Bundesbank's 
involvement in banking supervision in section 7 of the Banking Act.20 As well as being involved in 
the supervisory process, the Bundesbank is also involved in matters relating to supervisory policy-
making.  As  a  member  of  the  Financial  Markets  Regulatory  Forum,  it  is  acknowledged  as  an 
authority that together with BaFin is responsible for the stability of the financial system.21 
As a result  of  the Bank of England Act 1998,22 the Bank of England has a limited role in the 
regulation and supervision of banks. A review of the extent of the Bank of England’s role in bank 
regulation has achieved partial realisation with the introduction of the 2009 Banking Act.
C. The Need for a Special Resolution Regime 
The Northern Rock crisis highlighted problems which were inherent in the tripartite arrangement 
between the Treasury, the Financial Services Authority and the Bank of England for dealing with 
financial stability which includes amongst others, the inability of the Bank to act as lender of last 
resort for a limited time without such a role being made public. The consultation paper issued in 
July 2008,23 as a response by the authorities to the Northern Rock Crisis and to strengthen the U.K. 
framework  for  financial  stability,  envisaged  a  leading  role  for  the  Bank  of  England  in  the 
implementation of a special resolution regime for banks.24
The establishment of a “special resolution regime” which should enable the seizure of a failing bank 
and facilitate all or part of its business to be transferred to a “bridge bank” which would manage 
services for customers, is also a consequence of the Northern Rock crisis. 
The Banking Act 2009 received Royal Assent on the 12 February 2009 – legislation having been 
introduced into Parliament on the 7 October 2008.25 As well as formalising the role of the Bank of 
England in its  oversight of systemically vital  payment systems, the Banking Act 2009 has also 
resulted in statutory powers being granted to the Bank of England, in respect of its responsibility for 
financial stability.26 The Act is divided into eight sections which deal with the special resolution 
regime,  bank  insolvency,  bank  administration  procedures,  inter  bank  payment  systems  and  the 
Financial Compensation Scheme. 
19  Deutsche Bundesbank,  „Bundesbank and German Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin)“ 
<http://www.bundesbank.de/bankenaufsicht/bankenaufsicht_bafin.en.php >
20 ibid
21  ibid
22  Whereby powers related to the supervision and regulation of banks were transferred to the Financial Services 
Authority. 
23  HM Treasury, Bank of England and FSA, 2008, “Financial Stability and Depositor Protection: Further 
Consultation,” July 2008.   
24  See W Nier, ‘Financial Stability Frameworks and the Role of Central Banks: Lessons from the Crisis’ IMF Working 
Paper WP/09/70 April 2009 at page 21.
25  See HM Treasury, „Banking Act 2009“ <http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/fin_banking_act2009.htm> 
26  Regulatory and supervisory responsibilities had been formally passed to the Financial Services Authority (FSA) 
under the Bank of England Act 1998.
The special resolution regime, which constitutes the focal point, in respect of measures aimed at 
dealing with failing banks, is the new statutory and permanent regime which consolidates temporary 
measures  introduced  by  the  Banking  (Special  Provisions)  Act  2008  (BSPA)27 which  was 
implemented as a means of exercising control and bringing Northern Rock into temporary public 
ownership in February 2008. According to Part 128, section 1 (1) of the Act, the purpose of the 
special resolution regime for banks is to address the situation where all or part of the business of a 
bank has encountered, or is likely to encounter financial difficulties. The special resolution regime 
consists  of   three  stabilisation  options,29 the  bank  insolvency  procedures30 and  the  bank 
administration procedures.31
The FSA is the triggering authority. The trigger is pulled “… once the FSA considers the bank is 
‘failing or likely to fail to meet its threshold condition’ and ‘due to the circumstances the bank is not 
reasonably likely to turn its fortunes around so that it meets its threshold conditions’.”32
The  Act  not  only  consolidates  the  tripartite  arrangement  as  established  under  the  2006 
Memorandum of Understanding, but is also evidential of the extension of the Bank of England’s 
role in the supervisory process.33 This is reflected in sections such as those of 7 and 8 of the Act, 
which clarify responsibilities in relation to the exercise of powers. In respect of bank insolvency 
procedures, an insolvency order may be made only on the application of the FSA with the consent 
27  „What the BSPA provided for  was inter  alia,  a  ready means for  the Tripartite  Authorities  (Treasury,  Bank of 
England and the Financial Services Authority, FSA) to transfer “the ownership or business of UK authorised deposit 
takers … either into public ownership, or to another body in the private sector”.
Temporarily taking a (deemed) failing British bank into public ownership involved a transfer of an institution’s 
assets and liabilities and property rights, in whole or in part, for the time being to a ‘bridge bank’, being a wholly 
owned subsidiary which the Bank of  England established for  this purpose.  This  transfer  was not  envisaged as 
nationalisation per se, but rather an exercise in control even if, while in State hands (in the interim ownership of the 
bridge bank), the authorities might resolve to choose from two options (‘resolution tools’ as the options have been 
described) provided for from the point of view of the public interest in confidence in banking; its systemic stability; 
and minimising the cost to the taxpayer of crisis management.“ See  F Raghallaigh and M Kennedy, „Banking 
Crises and Special Resolution Regimes“ February 2011 at page 39.
28 „ Part 1 (stabilisation) provides for a capacity on the part of the authorities, acting according to law effectively to 
seize the balance sheets (with ‘securities’ and ‘property’ separately distinguished), in whole or in part, of a failing 
financial institution deemed essential to the systemic stability of the financial system. The language of the Act is not 
one of ‘seizure’, but rather ‘transfer’. The outcome is (temporary) public ownership. The initiative lies with the state 
authorities (FSA trigger). There is no right of appeal (e.g. to the courts) that lies with the involuntary transferor.“ see 
ibid at page 42.
29  See section 2 of the Act ; See also section 1 (3a-c) : These are a) transfer to a private sector purchaser b) transfer to a 
bridge bank, and c) transfer to temporary public ownership. Further, „the Act provides that three stabilisation tools 
are available to the authorities in respect of the securities and property (business) transferred or taken over. They 
may be sold on to a third party (P&A). They may be transferred to a bridge bank (see section 3.4 below) wholly 
owned by the Bank of England. Or, they may be put into temporary public ownership (TPO) in a Treasury owned, 
specially  created  banking  entity.  The  toolkit  is  both  calibrated  and  represents  a  ranking  of  preferences  of  the 
authorities, from a preferred sale post transfer to TPO (last resort).  See  F Raghallaigh and M Kennedy, „Banking 
Crises and Special Resolution Regimes“ February 2011 at pages 42 and 43.
30  As stated under Part 2.
31  As provided under Part 3.
32  See F Raghallaigh and M Kennedy, „Banking Crises and Special Resolution Regimes“ February 2011 at page 42 
and  also  D  Singh,  The  UK Banking  Act  2009,  Bank  Resolution  and  Early  Intervention:  Policy  and  Practice, 
PowerPoint presentation, Symposium on Managing Systemic Risk, 7 – 9 April 2010, University of Warwick.
33  Financial Services Authority, „ Memorandum of Understanding between HM Treasury, the Bank of England and the 
Financial Services Authority“ < http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/mou/fsa_hmt_boe.pdf> 
of the Bank of England, or on the application of the Bank of England.34 Further, before exercising 
insolvency powers in respect of a residual bank, the FSA is required to give notice to the Bank of 
England.35 
Germany  is  one  of  the  most  recent  countries  at  this  point  in  time,  to  legislate  for  a  special 
framework within which to resolve banks that fall into difficulty – such a vehicle being provided by 
the Bank Restructuring Act or the Restrukturierungsgesetz (Restructuring Act).36
Three phases to the regime, as identified, are as follows:37
1. Restructuring (Sanierungsverfahren);
2. Reorganisation (Reorganisationsverfahren); and
3. Transfer (to bridge bank) (Übertragungsanordnung).
The rationale for such initiative  having been outlined by the Finance Ministry:38
New rules are urgently required. The existing insolvency legislation and supervisory instruments are intended to freeze 
a company’s operations. But doing so can negatively affect other financialmarket participants and the financial system 
as a whole. In the short term, state support measures, such as those brought in since the outbreak of the crisis in 2008, 
can limit the damage to financial markets.However, the government’s ability to manage a crisis will remain limited as 
long as there is no mechanism for an orderly restructuring or resolution process. At the same time, if banks are certain 
the state will rush to the rescue in an emergency, this diminishes their sense of responsibility in the business decisions 
they take and creates an incentive to take on an uncontrollable level of risk. The government must not be left to pay for 
this with taxpayers’ money.“
Despite the above mentioned reforms, some gaps which persist across several jurisdictions, and 
indeed across the globe, have been highlighted by the Basel Committee in its recent report and are 
as follows:39
− The fact that many countries continue to lack important legal powers to resolve a financial 
institution in distress.40
34  See section 117(2) of the Act. 
35  See section 157 of the Act.  
36  „The legislation was first  mooted on 31 March 2010, when the government advanced a set  of proposals in a 
discussion paper (the ‘key issues’ paper).  A bill  was introduced to Parliament on 25 August  2010, passed with 
amendments in 28 October 2010 by the lower house and on 26 November by the upper house. The Act came into 
effect on 1 January 2011.“ See F Raghallaigh and M Kennedy, „Banking Crises and Special Resolution Regimes“ 
February 2011 at page 53.
37 „A comprehensive scheme which extends to prudential supervisory and regulatory reforms to provide for Prompt 
corrective Action (PCA) as well as for a crisis and resolution management regime (SRR) for SIFIs.“; ibid. 
38  See ibid 
39  See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Resolution Policies and Frameworks – Progress So Far, July 2011, 
BIS Publications, particularly at pages 2 and 3 <http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs200.pdf>
40   „...And that where some powers are available, the lack of certain essential powers, including powers to terminate 
unnecessary contracts, continue needed contracts, sell assets and transfer liabilities, will risk making the resolution 
of the financial institution’s affairs difficult and costly. The BCBS Recommendations identified these legal powers 
as typically useful to enhance the ability of resolution authorities to continue systemically important financial 
functions while conducting an orderly resolution or liquidation of the individual financial firm. While some progress 
has been made, much remains to be done. „ see ibid at paragraph 6 page 2.
− Authorities  in  many countries  appear  to  lack  the  legal  powers  to  temporarily delay the 
operation  of  early  termination  provisions  in  financial  contracts  in  order  to  complete  a 
transfer of these contracts to a sound financial institution, a bridge financial institution or 
other public entity.41
− Shortcomings which continue to persist with respect to the resolution of a financial group, 
especially in a cross-border context.
− The fact that newly introduced tools or tools under consideration to deal with SIFIs, which 
include bridge bank powers or bail-in, are untested in many jurisdictions, or untested in their 
application to a complex multi-entity cross-border group or conglomerate.
− The uncertainty which remains in respect of the availability of temporary funding to support 
resolution measures. 
− Significant  differences  which  exist  among  the  various  deposit  protection  arrangements, 
which could complicate cross-border resolutions.
D. Central Bank Independence 
Central bank independence is considered as a means of achieving the goal of price stability.42 It is 
also interesting to note that Lastra recommends the inclusion of regulatory powers in any law which 
truly safeguards independence.43 This would infer that central bank independence would be ensured 
if the central bank was responsible for both monetary policy setting and regulatory functions – 
hence price stability would be better  facilitated through a  central  bank whose powers not only 
consisted of monetary policy setting functions, but also of regulatory and supervisory functions. 
The strong record held by the Deutsche Bundesbank and in particular, the pre-1999 Bundesbank in 
maintaining price stability is reiterated.44 However, the difficulty in finding a central bank whose 
independence is absolute is also highlighted.45 In as much as certain events and developments make 
it  difficult  to  ensure  that  a  central  bank's  independence  is  absolute,  developments  such  as 
conglomeration and globalisation have warranted the need for the involvement of a single regulator. 
However, this is a function which if not absolutely carried out by the central bank, should still, to a 
great extent, involve the central bank. 
There  appears  to  be  greater  support  for  central  bank  independence  when  compared  with 
independence granted to supervisory and regulatory agencies. Even though there is and there has 
been support  for central  bank independence – particularly with reference to independence from 
41  „Even if these powers exist, it is not clear if they will be recognised where financial contracts are governed by 
foreign laws.“
42  See RM Lastra, Legal Foundations of International Financial Stability 2006 45-46.  
43  ibid at page 46. 
44  ibid at pages 51-61. 
45  „The Bundesbank's scope for independence has been restricted as a result of two major developments namely: The 
German unification and the European Monetary Union. In  the case of German unification, the issue concerned 
national  identity,  not  price  stability.  The  Exchange  Rate  Mechanism  of  the  European  Monetary  System  was 
sacrificed in order to achieve the greater national objective of unifying the German people. With regards to the 
European Monetary Union, supranational integration was held to be more important for the future of the German 
nation than the maintenance of an independent central bank.“ For further information on this, see ibid at 58-61. 
Lastra highlights the fact that the independence of the Bundesbank has seldom been sacrificed on the basis that the 
economy was suffering.  
political interference, there is still some reluctance to grant independence to financial regulators and 
supervisors.46 According to Hüpkes and others, it is more difficult for financial regulators to design 
accountability arrangements than it is for central banks.47 In their opinion, the reluctance by policy 
makers to grant independence to supervisory and regulatory agencies is attributed to three factors.48 
The significance of central bank financial independence as a component of overall independence 
has been emphasised by the European Union.49 According to Buiter,50 two types of central bank 
independence exist,  namely,  target independence and operational  independence.  Four aspects  of 
central bank independence are considered by Smaghi namely:51 functional, institutional, personal 
and  financial  independence.  For  the  purposes  of  the  discussion  in  this  paper,  operational  and 
financial independence will constitute the focus of discussion. 
Central Bank Financial Independence 
Financial independence involves the independence of the central bank - when considered from the 
perspective of the funding of its activities and the exercise of its powers.52 In Amtenbrink’s view, 
the central bank’s legal basis may facilitate a system whereby a government which has been elected 
democratically determines the boundaries within which the central bank should decide on an actual 
capital  increase.53 However,  the  success  of  such  an  arrangement  would  be  dependent  on  the 
existence of a key factor, namely, the bank’s independence from the government at the time when 
the  actual  need  for  re  capitalisation  occurs.54 Furthermore,  central  bank financial  independence 
would be safeguarded where the central bank is not dependent on the government’s general budget 
but is able to address the needs of its financial operations through its own generated income.55 
According  to  Smaghi,56 legal  provisions  alone  are  generally  not  adequate  to  guarantee  the 
appropriate level of central bank independence – the respect for independence and its boundaries, 
amongst parties  involved, also being an important factor . He considers four elements of central 
bank  independence,  namely,  functional,  institutional,  personal  and  financial  independence.57 
Furthermore, he goes on to state that: 
“The  concept  of  financial  independence  should  therefore  be  assessed  from the  perspective  of 
whether any third party is able to exercise either direct or indirect influence not only over the tasks 
46  See EHG Hüpkes, M Quintyn, M Taylor, ‘The Accountability of Financial Sector Supervisors: Theory and Practice 
2006 at page 1. 
47  ibid, preface.  
48  ibid at page 1; The three factors include: Firstly, the fact that independent regulatory and supervisory agencies could 
become another branch of government which is not subject to the same level of scrutiny as that which is prescribed 
to the executive, legislative and judicial branches. Secondly, without adequate regulatory oversight, regulators may 
favor industry interests over those of the public – hence facilitating the possibility of a “regulatory capture” 
occurring. Thirdly, self interest may contribute to policy makers’ reluctance to giving up their oversight functions.  
49  See P Stella and A Lönnberg, ‚Issues in Central Bank Finance and Independence’ IMF Working Paper WP/08/37 
and in particular, the European Monetary Institute’s report EMI (1998) “Convergence report” at page 295.  
50  See W Buiter, ‘What’s Left of Central Bank Independence?’ < http://blogs.ft.com/maverecon/2009/05/whats-left-of-
central-bank-independence/> 
51  See LB Smaghi, ‘Central Bank Independence in the EU: From Theory to Practice’ European Law Journal, Vol. 14, 
No. 4, July 2008.  
52  See R Smits, ‘European Central bank Institutional Aspects’ 1997 Kluwer Law International at page 157.  
53  F Amtenbrink, ‘Securing Financial Independence in the Legal Basis of a Central Bank’ at page 6.  
54  ibid
55  ibid
56  See LB Smaghi, ‘Central Bank Independence in the EU: From Theory to Practice’ European Law Journal, Vol. 14, 
No. 4, July 2008, p. 446. 
57  ibid
of a central bank but also over its ability (understood both operationally, in terms of manpower, and 
financially, in terms of appropriate financial resources) to fulfil its mandate.”58 
Ensuring  absolute  independence  with  central  bank  financial  independence  also  constitutes  a 
difficult task. This is illustrated by the close links which exist between the central bank and the 
Treasury in many countries.  Is  it  possible  for a  central  bank to  operate  effectively -  given the 
presence  of  absolute  independence?  The  importance  of  close  collaboration  and  exchange  of 
information between the tripartite authorities in the UK (the FSA, the Treasury and the Bank of 
England) was highlighted by the Northern Rock Crisis. These, if effective as they should have been, 
could have helped, not only in identifying the problems which existed at Northern Rock,59 but to 
facilitate timely intervention which would have averted the scale of the crisis. 
Operational independence 
This is defined as “…the freedom or ability of a central bank to pursue its objectives (regardless of 
who sets them) as it sees fit, without interference or pressure from third parties.”60 In order for such 
independence to be effective, it is also argued that freedom from political influences is vital.61 As is 
the case with financial independence, absolute independence is extremely rare given the fact that 
the central bank, in many jurisdictions, is connected in one way or the other to the State and the 
sovereign. Illustrating with the scenario which exists in the UK, the central bank is owned by the 
Treasury62 and several checks, for example, the role of the Treasury in underwriting risk attending 
emergency lending,  are vital  to ensuring accountability in matters  relating to the central  bank’s 
position.63 Furthermore, regional and global developments are factors which may contribute to the 
status  of  independence  attained  by  a  central  bank.  For  instance,  the  Bundesbank's  scope  for 
independence  has  been  restricted  as  a  result  of  two major  developments  namely:  The  German 
unification and the European Monetary Union.64
Arguments For and Against Central Bank Independence 
Arguments In Favour 
Need to ensure that central bank can act freely in pursuit of its objectives without interference from 
political pressures or other third parties. 
Where  operational  independence  exists,  excessive  interest  rate  cuts  resulting  from  political 
58  Ibid at 452.
59  It should be added that a lot of factors contributed to Northern Rock’s collapse – amongst which are the 
inadequacies of the measurements under Basel 2 and issues related to liquidity.  
60  See W Buiter, ‘What’s Left of Central Bank Independence?’ < http://blogs.ft.com/maverecon/2009/05/whats-left-of-
central-bank-independence/> 
61  ibid
62  W Buiter Central Banks and Financial Crises (Paper presented at the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City’s 
symposium on “Maintaining Stability in a Changing Financial System” at page 40. 
63  See P Stella and A Lönnberg, ‘Issues in Central Bank Finance and Independence’ IMF Working Paper WP/08/37.
64  See RM Lastra, Legal Foundations of International Financial Stability Oxford University Press 2006 at page 58.  
pressures could be avoided.65 However, excessive interest rates cuts may not be consequential of 
political pressures as they may arise through the application of the precautionary principle. 
Other factors which may contribute to excessive interest rate cuts include extreme sensitivity to 
matters relating to the financial sector (which indicate “cognitive regulatory capture”) and failures 
by strategic members of the FOMC to comprehend adequately the way in which the interest rate 
mechanism should operate (hence an inappropriate application of the mechanism).66 At times of 
high uncertainty, appropriate application of the interest rate mechanism as a tool of monetary policy 
should be timely, decisive and flexible and should focus on the principal risk.67 
Arguments against 
This could lead to abuse of powers. The level of independence granted should correspondingly be 
justified by sufficient checks and balances. 
Regulatory capture: Bank collapses such as BCCI and Barings raised concerns regarding the ability 
of the Bank of England , as supervisor to separate itself adequately from the culture of the banking 
industry in order to enable it function as a truly independent supervisor and regulator.68 Due to lack 
of transparency, the kind of regime under which the Bank of England operated then, as regulator, a 
regime of informal and negotiated enforcement, was prone to two forms of abuse.69 Firstly, it could 
degenerate into the capture of the regulatory system by the regulated, and secondly, it could conceal 
selective enforcement and possible harsh treatment of less significant regulatees.70 
Close collaboration with other authorities may be vital to ensuring that complete, adequate and 
timely information relating to systemically relevant individual institutions is obtained. 
Provided adequate balances and checks are in place to guard against any abuse that could result 
from a grant of independence,  impediment to close collaboration between regulatory authorities 
should be overcome. Furthermore, adequate mechanisms of accountability should help to avoid a 
situation whereby regulatory capture could occur. 
Having  highlighted  the  fundamental  role  contributed  by  central  banks  to  the  regulatory  and 
supervisory  process  and  the  importance  of  central  bank  independence,  measures  aimed  at 
safeguarding an extension of such powers should be in place. 
65  W Buiter, Central Banks and Financial Crises (Paper presented at the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City’s 
symposium on “Maintaining Stability in a Changing Financial System” at page 113.  
66  ibid at pages 113,114.  
67  See ibid pages 53 and 54; For further information on optimal decision making under uncertainty and whether 
regulator’s focus should be directed at extreme risks, also see ibid at page 54.  
68  See Treasury and Civil Service Committee, Sixth Report: “The Regulation of Financial Services in the UK” House 
of Commons, (1994-1995) 332 para 108.  
69  C Hadjiemanuil, Banking Regulation and the Bank of England 1995 Lloyds of London Press at page 182.  
70  ibid
E. Measures Adopted in the Aftermath of the Recent Crises 
Following the introduction of the 2009 Banking Act in the UK,71 the following measures which are 
aimed at ensuring greater independent accountability, have been adopted correspondingly with an 
extension of the Bank of England’s powers in regulation: 
1) A new Financial Stability Committee (FSC), which is a product of the Act and which is a 
sub committee of the Court of Directors.72 It comprises of the Governor of the Bank, deputy 
governors  and  four  non  executive  directors  appointed  by the  chair  of  the  Court.73 The 
functions of the Committee as stipulated in the Act are:74
 To make recommendations to the Court of Directors, which they shall consider, about the nature 
and implementation of the Bank’s strategy in relation to the Financial Stability Objective; to give 
advice about whether and how the Bank should act in respect of an institution, where the issue 
appears to the Committee to be relevant to the Financial Stability Objective; in particular, to give 
advice about whether and how the Bank should use stabilisation powers under Part 1 of the Banking 
Act 2009 in particular cases; to monitor the Bank’s use of the stabilisation powers; to monitor the 
Bank’s exercise of its functions under Part 5 of the Banking Act 2009 (inter-bank payment systems), 
and any other functions delegated to the Committee by the Court of Directors for the purpose of 
pursuing the Financial Stability Objective. 
2)  Efforts are being undertaken to facilitate the Bank’s access to supervisory information with 
the Treasury indicating that the Bank will be able to make recommendations to the FSA in 
respect of its framework for regulation and supervision.75
 
3) The Turner Review which not only elaborates on ways in which responsibilities of a macro 
prudential nature could be allocated between the Bank and the FSA, but also on how this 
could be implemented.76
In  Germany,  the  perception  that  the  allocation  of  responsibilities  between the  Bundesbank  and 
BaFin  had  lacked  clarity  and  transparency  resulted  in  the  issue  of  a  new  Memorandum  of 
Understanding in February 2008.77 This followed a series of government bailouts of state owned 
banks in 2008 – which in part, was attributed to the systemic importance assumed by such banks 
and the potential disastrous consequences which could occur if  they had been allowed to fail.78 
Close links exist between member banks of the German Savings Banks Finance Group (Sparkassen-
71  „The framework provided for by the Banking Act 2009 has been further developed in one important respect : living 
wills. The Financial Services Act 2010 (FSA/10) provides at section 7, for a duty on the FSA to require authorised 
firms to prepare and maintain ‘living wills’,  or as they are formally referred to,  recovery and resolution plans 
(RRPs). Section 7 in fact, is a detailed series of amendments to section 139 of the Financial Services and Markets 
Act 2000.“ See F Raghallaigh and M Kennedy, „Banking Crises and Special Resolution Regimes“ February 2011 at 
page 44. 
72  See Bank of England, „News Release, Financial Stability Committee“ < 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/news/2009/048.htm> 
73  ibid
74  ibid
75  See W Nier, ‘Financial Stability Frameworks and the Role of Central Banks: Lessons from the Crisis’ IMF Working 
Paper WP/09/70 April 2009 page 21. 
76   ibid
77  See W Nier, ‘Financial Stability Frameworks and the Role of Central Banks: Lessons from the Crisis’ IMF Working 
Paper WP/09/70 April 2009 at pages 21 and 22.  
78  W Reuter, Spiegel Online ,“Worst Financial Crisis Since 1931?“ 
<http://www.spiegel.de/international/business/0,1518,536635,00.html>  
Finanzgruppe) and as long as they are in the position to do so, they are required to bail each other 
out. The problem which existed at the time resulted from the fact that many of these banks were 
facing financial difficulties – hence were not in the position to assist other member banks.79 
The crisis faced by IKB, Landesbanken and Hypo Real Estates not only revealed an absence of a 
special resolution regime for banks, but also raised the issue of optimal measures which could be 
implemented  to  control  (in  part)  privately  owned,  but  publicly-sponsored  or  (in  part)  publicly 
owned financial enterprises.80
Conclusion 
Central  banks  have  vital  roles  to  play  in  the  maintenance  of  price  stability,  achieving  and 
maintaining stability within the financial system, and the provision of liquidity. A huge problem to 
be  addressed  at  international  level  in  efforts  aimed  at  making  cross-border  resolutions  more 
effective incorporates a lack of harmonization of insolvency laws. Other key issues which have 
been identified, as well as concrete steps that could be taken at international level to make cross-
border resolutions more effective, include in particular, the following:81
-  strengthening supervisory capacity  of relevant national authorities and coordination through 
college structures in the pre-crisis phase;
- developing and maintaining knowledge and skills relevant to financial crisis resolution so that 
national  authorities  remain  capable  of  responding  quickly  and  effectively  to  financial  crises; 
facilitating  implementation  of  the  new  capital  requirements  to  enhance  loss  absorbency,  eg 
increased equity buffers and non-viability triggered convertible debt instrument; harmonising (or 
achieving greater convergence) at the international level of specific resolution powers, including 
property transfer and share transfer powers; 
- ensuring through national law reform or mandatory change of financial contract terms that the 
exercise of certain resolution powers, such as property transfer powers, that promote continuity, do 
not trigger default thereby resulting in  early termination  of financial contracts; harmonising (or 
achieving greater convergence) of the scope of national resolution regimes (ie as regards the types 
of institution subject to such regimes) and extending the scope to non-bank financial institutions, 
including non-bank parent companies; 
-  enabling  national  authorities  to  implement  group-wide  resolutions  in  the  case  of  distressed 
financial  conglomerates;  identifying and removing the specific  legal  obstacles  to  cross-border 
cooperation  (eg  confidentiality  obligations  preventing  the  cross-border  sharing  of  information; 
preference of domestic creditors over foreign creditors; requirements under local law, such as local 
threshold conditions for authorisation, that prevent the operation of a bridge institution in a foreign 
jurisdiction; 
79  ibid
80  W Nier, ‘Financial Stability Frameworks and the Role of Central Banks: Lessons from the Crisis’ IMF Working 
Paper WP/09/70 April 2009 at page 22. 
81  Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, „Resolution Policies and Frameworks – Progress so Far“) at pages 40 
and 41
and establishing a  framework for the cross-border recognition and enforcement  of resolution 
measures and regulatory actions, which may take the form of high-level principles on cross-border 
coordination and cooperation.“
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